The ACT Coroner, Maria Doogan, has released her report into the 2003 Canberra fires that killed four people, injured 435 people, and destroyed 487 houses.
While it is arguable that more should have been done to reduce fuel loads in the winter months of 2002, or to attack the fires more aggressively after the lightning strikes of 8 January 2003, the critical issue has always been the absence of compelling pre-fire warnings to the residents of Canberra on 15, 16 or 17 January. Given the intensity of the fires and the prevailing weather conditions, there was little that could have been done in the days immediately prior to 18 January 2003 to stop the fires. The failure to warn is addressed in Chapter 7 of the report.
From the morning of Wednesday 15 January 2003, it should have been clear to the Emergency Services Bureau that the predicted weather conditions for 17-20 January were such that the fire would burn into the Canberra suburbs. At that point, a number of clear warnings were necessary. Canberrans should have been warned: (1) a serious bush fire is approaching and it represents a significant risk to Canberra residents; (2) how to prepare their home and personal effects for the fire; and (3) they need to decide early whether to fight or flee the flames.
However, the Coroner observed,
Until the first Standard Emergency Warning Signal was sounded at about 2.40 pm on Saturday 18 January, there had been no official warnings to the people of Canberra. The SEWS message was too little, and it was delivered far too late.
More seriously, the Coroner noted,
Mr Stanhope either misunderstood or deliberately downplayed the seriousness of the situation in his comments on ABC 666 and 2CC radio station at about 3.00 pm [on 18 January], referring to the declaration of a state of emergency as ‘essentially an administrative measure’ and telling people who were obviously in danger not to be unduly anxious or alarmed.
There has always been a limited number of explanations for the failure to warn Canberra. Either the Emergency Services Bureau was incompetent in its assessment of the fire threat, and/or the ACT Government was negligent and/or incompetent in its failure to warn the citizenry of Canberra. The Coroner opted for the latter explanation. The fire threat was known and communicated in-confidence to the ACT Cabinet and to senior ACT Ambulance and Fire Brigade staff on 16 January 2003. The scale of the threat was clearly understood at the time. However, it was not communicated to the Australian Federal Police. Nor was action taken to warn Canberrans.
The Coroner’s conclusions are compelling,
My overall impression is that senior personnel at the Emergency Services Bureau lacked competence and professionalism and that the bureau was disorganised and was functioning in a chaotic, uncoordinated fashion, particularly during the most critical period of the fires. It seems the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing, and neither hand was actually doing very much to deal with a crisis that was escalating, day by day, hour by hour.
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The Emergency Services Bureau had been specifically warned as long ago as 1991, again in 1994—in Mr Cheney’s assessment of the Hannan report and the later endorsement of Mr Cheney’s assessment in the McBeth report—and subsequently of the potential for a firestorm of the type experienced in 2003, but the bureau failed to implement procedures to take account of such an eventuality arising from a combination of drought, high winds, high temperatures, low humidity, an ignition source, and a heavy fuel load.
At all relevant times, as Chief Minister and Attorney-General, Mr Stanhope was responsible for the Department of Justice and Community Safety (which organisationally housed the Emergency Services Bureau). Mr Stanhope was also acting in the role of Minister for Emergency Services at the time of the conflagration on 18 January 2003 and on the previous day. As such, in accordance with the conventions of the Westminster model of responsible government, which apply in Australia, Mr Stanhope was the relevant Minister at the most critical time of the firestorm.
On Thursday 16 January, two days before the firestorm hit the suburbs, the Cabinet generally, including Mr Stanhope, knew a potential disaster was on Canberra’s doorstep but did nothing to ensure that the Canberra community was warned promptly and effectively.
To date, the ACT Government has reacted to any criticisms of it by saying it is inappropriate to criticise the hard working fire-fighters who did their best on the day. For a long time this diversionary tactic worked. The Coroner has now pierced the smoke-screen (pun vaguely intended) to apportion blame.
