Oz Politics Blog

The critical issue at the heart of The Dismissal was money. Since the Glorious Revolution of 1689, the Crown has required the consent of Parliament to raise taxes and spend money. This requirement is a foundation of the Australian Constitution.

In October 1975, the Senate refused to pass the Government’s budget. It resolved in respect of each of the budget bills,

… this Bill be not further proceeded with until the Government agrees to submit itself to the judgment of the people, the Senate being of the opinion that the Prime Minister and his Government no longer have the trust and confidence of the Australian people …

The month long standoff between the Prime Minister and the Senate was resolved on 11 November 1975 when the Governor-General unilaterally dismissed the Prime Minister and appointed the Leader of the Opposition as a caretaker Prime Minister. The new Prime Minister saw the Budget passed. The Governor-General immediately dissolved both houses of Parliament, and an election was held on 13 December 1975. The Whitlam Government was soundly defeated at the poll.

Could it happen again? Absolutely! For example, it is entirely plausible that Labor could win the next election, while the Coalition retains sufficient numbers to block Budget bills in the Senate. If this happened, the fundamentals are in place for the Senate to refuse supply to the Government.

Is it likely? It depends on what you mean.

If you were asking whether it is likely that a hostile Senate would refuse supply in the future — I would say yes. However, an opposition controlled Senate is only likely to continue blocking supply if it judged the mood of the electorate was in its favour and against the government of the day.

If you were asking whether it is likely that the Governor-General would intervene unilaterally as Kerr did — I think this is less likely.

First, there is now an acceptance in Australia that the Westminster doctrine of responsible government includes the accountability to both houses of parliament for Budget bills. Implied in this is the acceptance that while a Prime Minister does not have to resign or advise an election at the point when supply is first delayed, ultimately he or she must resign or call an election if the Senate continues to block supply.

Second, having seen the opprobrium that John Kerr suffered following the dismissal of 1975, future Governors-General would only take unilateral action to dismiss the Prime Minister as a last resort. Future Governors-General are much more likely to urge a political solution to a political problem.

Third, the budget cycle has changed since 1975. Budget bills are now passed over 6 weeks between mid May and 30 June, rather than over 14 weeks between mid August and 30 November. This means that a supply crisis would more quickly come to a head. It would also quickly overtake the constitutionally required minimum of 33 days to hold an election.

Fourth, and most importantly, Whitlam was ambushed by an innovation he and others were not expecting. This innovation has since been studied and a number of weaknesses have emerged.

• If had acted quickly, Whitlam could have had the House of Representatives rescind its support for the Budget Bills. This would have denied Fraser the ability to secure supply for the Crown, and Fraser would have had to resign. If that had happened, Kerr would have been required to reappoint Whitlam as Prime Minister. Very messy.
• Whitlam could also have kept the House of Representatives in session, as it cannot be dissolved while it is in session. The House adjourned so that the Speaker could communicate with the Governor-General. While it was adjourned, it was dissolved.

Because Kerr’s innovation is not a guaranteed failsafe mechanism to resolve a supply crisis, I believe it is highly unlikely to be used in the future.