Howard played poker with Bush and won the bluff
The invasion of Iraq by the coalition of the willing was and is a foreign policy fiasco. While the war in Afghanistan was a direct and proportionate response to the events of 11 September 2001, the war in Iraq had little to do with Al-Qaeda and reducing the risks of world terrorism. The Iraq campaign was ill-considered.
In that will-we-won’t-we hiatus between September 2002 and March 2003 I recall an American commentator said something like, ‘America will win the war easily; the difficulty will be winning the peace.’ At the time those words resonated with me, and now they seem prophetic. The feared Vietnam-like quagmire now seems close to inevitable. The fatality count grows for the Americans and an exit strategy remains elusive.
Also, at the time, I considered the decision of the Howard government to join the coalition of the willing to have been the worst of his Prime Ministership. It was a decision I could not comprehend, and one which I considered morally reprehensible. In my mind it was not a just war and Australia should not support it.
Oh sure, Saddam Hussein was a tyrant, and his removal may well serve the greater good, but he was not Robinson Crusoe. Of necessity, world peace requires us to accept international arrangements we would not tolerate in Australia. As for the dream of democratising the Middle East: it is a fantasy. The necessary economic and worldview preconditions do not exist. The ethnic and religious divisions within Iraq and the wider region are almost insurmountable.
Notwithstanding the above, I have reassessed Howard’s decision to join the coalition of the willing. My reassessment is not of merits of the most recent Iraq war, but of Howard’s decision to support Bush. In retrospect I consider it to have been clever, tactical decision – albeit in a way I did not perceive at the time.
So what is the basis of my reassessment?
By September 2002, the Australian Government would have concluded that America was implacably committed to invading Iraq. There would have been no doubt in this assessment. An astute reader may point out that America did not formally decide to invade Iraq until 6 months later. True. However, diplomatic assessments revolve around discerning the real intention of a foreign government, not reiterating its espoused intentions. The coded American intention was clearly flagged. There was not doubt that America was gearing up for an inevitable war.
For as long as America was undecided on a war with Iraq, the logical and right thing for Australia was to point out the flaws with the proposed approach. But once it had determined that America was committed to the war, that course of action would be detrimental to Australia’s interests. At that point Australia would not and could not change America’s mind. But Australia could lose if it stood in the way of the American super-power.
In September 2002, Howard had a choice, he could play populist local politics and (like France and Germany) stand against the war in Iraq, or he could use the American commitment to advance Australia’s international interests. I believe Howard chose the latter course.
Howard’s decision to join the coalition of the willing has been portrayed as sycophancy, but I have come to the conclusion it was much more tactical. His commitment of Australian troops was modest, and in the most-part only for the duration of the shooting-war. He has largely left the more difficult task of winning the peace to the other coalition members. Furthermore, whether by good luck or good management, Howard has achieved the appearance of a larger commitment without an Australian troop fatality and minimal casualties.
While France and Germany have had to enure the winter of America’s discontent since 2002, Australia has basked in the sunshine of America’s pleasure. The Australian-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would not have been possible without Australia’s commitment to the recent war in Iraq. We paid a small price for what in the long-term should be a great prize.
Some at this point may argue that I am celebrating Howard’s decision to put aside morality and ethics to act expediently in Australia’s interests. Some may even describe my analysis of Howard’s actions as moral prostitution or of the FTA as thirty pieces of silver.
However, I think such criticisms are naive. Moral purity and outrage is vanity. A government should be interested in outcomes for its population before it is interested in maintaining its image. While I believe in principled actions I am not a fundamentalist on the subject. There are occasional times when governments should put aside principle for pragmatism.
So long as Australia could dissuade America from a poor course of action, that should have been her objective. But there was a point of no return. A point where America had made her decision and nothing Australia could say would change that. At that point, a reassessment was called for: a reassessment that acknowledged America’s actions are not in the world’s best interests, but which also acknowledged blanket opposition to America’s decision is not in Australia’s best interests.
I suspect Howard made such a reassessment. He sought to make the most from a classic lose-lose situation. Whatever Howard did would damn him. And in the face of this dilemma, Howard chose real outcomes for Australians over the moral vanity of opposition to the United States. Furthermore, Howard did the minimum possible to sign up with George Bush. He ensured Australia had a quick exit strategy from the subsequent imbroglio. And with the FTA, he ensured Australia was well paid for her troubles. He made the proverbial silk purse from a sow’s ear.
While I remain opposed to Bush’s decision to engage in warfare against Iraq, I find things I respect in Howard’s decision to support Bush. Howard played poker with Bush, and won the bluff. He spent the winnings on Australia’s future.